Abstract-In recent years, the information theory of covert communications, where the very presence of the communication is undetectable to a watchful adversary Willie, has been of great interest. Our recent work introduced the information-theoretic limits for communication by covert users Alice and Bob, over packet channels where the packet timings of legitimate users Jack and Steve are governed by a Poisson point process. Here we consider the extension to timing channels characterized by more general renewal processes of rate λ. We consider two scenarios. In the first scenario, the source of the packets on the channel cannot be authenticated by Willie, and therefore Alice can insert packets into the channel. We show that if the total number of transmitted packets by Jack is N , Alice can covertly insert O ( √ N ) packets and, if she transmits more, she will be detected by Willie. In the second scenario, packets are authenticated by Willie but we assume that Alice and Bob share a secret key; hence, Alice alters the timings of the packets according to a pre-shared codebook with Bob to send information to him over a G/M/1 queue with service rate µ > λ. We show that Alice can covertly and reliably transmit O(N ) bits to Bob when the total number of packets sent from Jack to Steve is N .
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I. INTRODUCTION
Secrecy and privacy are key concerns in modern communication systems. Most security research is focused on protecting the content of the message from being decrypted by an adversary, and there has been significant work in both traditional cryptographic approaches and informationtheoretic secrecy approaches to achieve this goal. However, as clearly illustrated in recent high-profile security scenarios (e.g. the Snowden disclosures [1] ), it is often the mere presence of a message between two parties that must be hidden rather than just its content. Applications range from military scenarios, where the volume of radio traffic can indicate the presence and magnitude of activity, to domestic scenarios, where an authority might punish certain parties or at least shut down any communications, particularly those that are encrypted.
The information-theoretic limits of covert communication were only recently studied for additive white Gaussian (AWGN) channels [2] - [4] and later extended to provide a comprehensive characterization of the limits of covert communication over discrete memoryless channels (DMCs), This work has been supported by the National Science Foundation under grants CNS-1564067, ECCS-1309573, and CNS-1525642.
optical channels, and AWGN channels [5] - [9] , and motivated related works (e.g. [10] - [13] ).
In contrast to the bulk of the work in this emerging area, our work in [14] considered covert communication over packet-based channels where the timing of the packets of legitimate users is modeled by a Poisson point process. However, in practice, many channels do not have packet timings that obey such a convenient model. Hence, here we extend our results from [14] to scenarios where the packet timings are governed by a more general renewal process.
We consider a channel where an authorized (overt) transmitter Jack sends packets to an authorized (overt) receiver Steve, where the timings of packet transmission are modeled by a renewal (point) process with inter-arrival times governed by a probability density function (pdf) p 0 (x) and rate λ = (∫ ∞ x=0 xp 0 (x) ) −1 packets per second. As shown in Fig. 1 , covert transmitter Alice wishes to transmit data to a covert receiver, Bob, on this channel in the presence of an attentive adversary, Willie, who is monitoring the channel between Alice and Bob precisely to detect such transmissions. We consider two scenarios in detail. In the first scenario, we assume: (1) the warden Willie is not able to see packet contents, and therefore cannot authenticate the source of the packets (e.g., whether they are actually sent by Jack); and (2) Alice is restricted to packet insertion. Willie is aware that the timing of the packets of the allowed (i.e. overt) communication link follows a renewal process with inter-arrival time pdf p 0 (x), so he seeks to apply hypothesis testing to verify whether the packet process has the proper characteristics.
In the second scenario, we assume that Willie can look at packet contents and therefore can authenticate that packets are from Jack; thus, Alice is not able to insert packets. However, we allow Alice and Bob to share a secret key, and Alice has the ability to alter the packet timings to convey information to Bob, whom is receiving the packets through a G/M/1 queue with service rate µ > λ.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the system model, definitions, and metrics. Then, we review the results for Poisson packet channels in Section III and provide constructions and their analysis for non-Poisson channels in Section IV. Section V contains the discussions and Section VI summaries our conclusions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL, DEFINITIONS, AND METRICS

A. System Model
Suppose that Jack transmits packets to Steve, while a watchful warden Willie observes the packets flowing from Jack to Steve and attempts to discern any irregularities that might indicate someone is altering aspects of the packet stream to convey information. Indeed, Alice's goal is to do exactly that: manipulate the packets sent by Jack to Steve so as to communicate covertly with Bob, who is located beyond the warden Willie but before the intended recipient Steve. One such scenario illustrating the location of the various parties is shown in Fig. 1 . We consider two specific operating scenarios. In both Scenarios we assume that the transmission times for the packets transmitted by Jack are modeled by a renewal process in which the inter-arrival times are positive i.i.d random variables with probability density function (pdf) p 0 (x) and transmission rate is λ = (∫ ∞ 0 xp 0 (x) ) −1 . We will term this a "renewal channel". Scenario 1 (Packet insertion): Scenario 1 is shown in Fig.  1 and analyzed in Section IV.A. We assume that Willie is not able to authenticate the packets to see if a packet is coming from Jack. He knows that the legitimate communication is modeled by a renewal process with inter-arrival time pdf p 0 (x), and he knows all of the characteristics of Alice's packet buffering and release scheme. Also, we assume that Alice, with knowledge of p 0 (x), is allowed to insert and transmit her own packets, buffer and release Jack's transmitted packets when she desires, but not share a codebook with Bob who is able to authenticate, receive and remove the covert packets; therefore, Steve does not observe the covert packets. In this scenario, we determine the number of packets that Alice can insert covertly into the channel while remaining covert.
Scenario 2 (Packet timing): Scenario 2 is shown in Fig. 2 and analyzed in Section IV.B. We assume that Willie is able to access packet contents and hence can authenticate whether a packet comes from Jack. Therefore, Alice cannot insert packets into the channel. However, we assume that Alice and Bob can share a secret codebook based on which Alice alters the packet timings by buffering packets and releasing them when she desires into the channel, thereby enabling covert communication through packet timing control. Moreover, Bob has access to the resulting packet stream only after it passes through a queue which processes the packets on a First-In-First-Out (FIFO) basis, i.e, upon departure of a packet, the next packet waiting in queue is processed. The queue, has i.i.d exponential service times, its service rate is µ > λ, it is in equilibrium, and its input and output rate are equal. In addition, we assume Willie knows that the legitimate communication is modeled by a renewal process with inter-arrival time pdf p 0 (x), and he knows all of the characteristics of Alice's packet buffering and release scheme except a secret key that is pre-shared between Alice and Bob. In this scenario, we calculate the number of bits that Alice can reliably and covertly transmit to Bob, per N packet transmitted by Jack, without detection by Willie. such that the k th arrival occurs at ∑ k i=1 a i ; a decoder which upon observation of all n departures selects the correct codeword with probability greater than 1 − δ, assuming that the queue is in equilibrium. The n th departure from the queue occurs on the average (over equiprobable codewords and the queue distributions) no later than T . The rate of an (n, M, T, δ)-code is defined as log M T . In Definition 1 in [15] , the queue is initially empty. However, similar to [15, Theorem 6] , this condition is replaced with the condition that the queue is in equilibrium in the above definition.
Definition 2. [15, Definition 2]
R is δ−achievable at output rate λ if for all γ > 0 there exists a sequence of (n, M, n/λ, δ)-codes such that
Rate R is achievable at output rate λ if it is δ-achievable at output rate λ for all 0 < δ < 1. The capacity of the queue at output rate λ, is the maximum achievable rate at output rate λ.
Definition 3. (Hypothesis Testing)
Willie is faced with a binary hypothesis test: the null hypothesis (H 0 ) corresponds to the case that Alice does not transmit, and the alternative hypothesis H 1 corresponds to the case that Alice transmits. We denote the distributions of sequences of inter-arrival times that Willie observes by P 1 and P 0 under H 1 and H 0 , respectively. Also, we denote by P F A the probability of rejecting H 0 when it is true (type I error or false alarm), and P M D the probability of rejecting H 1 when it is true (type II error or missed detection). We assume that Alice's probability of transmission is 1 2 and Willie knows this value; the generalization to arbitrary prior probabilities is straightforward [3] . Also, we assume that Willie uses classical hypothesis testing and seeks to minimize P F A + P M D . 
Definition 5. (Reliability) A transmission scheme is reliable if and only if the probability that a codeword transmission from Alice to Bob is unsuccessful is upper bounded by ζ for any ζ > 0. Note that this metric applies in Scenario 2.
C. Metrics
In this paper, a covert packet is a packet that is inserted by Alice into the channel (not originally from Jack), and an overt packet is a packet that is transmitted originally by Jack. We denote the number of covert packets that Alice can insert into the channel (in Scenario 1) and the number of overt packets that Alice can buffer covertly (in Lemma 1) by N c . Also, we denote the amount of covert information that Alice can convey to Bob through inter-packet delays in Scenario 2 by N b .
III. POISSON CHANNELS
In this section, we review the results for Poisson channels. Consider the following Theorems [14] : 
IV. NON-POISSON CHANNELS
A. General Renewal Model, Packet Insertion (Scenario 1)
In this section, we consider Scenario 1: On a renewal channel, Willie cannot authenticate packets to see whether they are from Jack or Alice, and Alice is only allowed to send information to Bob by inserting packets into the channel. In [14] , the inter-arrival time was exponential, and thus for the packet insertion we were able to exploit the fact that the superposition of two independent Poisson point processes is a Poisson point process; Alice simply generated a Poisson point process of the appropriate rate and used it to govern the timings of her packet insertions onto the Jack-to-Steve channel. However, such a technique does not readily extend to channels governed by non-Poisson renewal processes, and thus a different technique is required here.
In particular, Alice generates a renewal process B in which the pdf of the inter-arrival times is
is a scaled version of p 0 (x) that (slightly) shortens the inter-arrival times, and therefore the rate of the generated renewal process λ B is (slightly) higher than Jack's transmission rate λ. This, allows Alice to transmit covert packets at a low rate (λ B − λ) as well as overt packets at rate λ. To do this, Alice performs a virtual Bernoulli splitting (p-thinning) on B, i.e., each time she wants to send a packet, she decides based on a Bernoulli random variable whether to send an overt or covert packet. Assuming that Alice always has covert packets to send, the proposed scheme requires Alice to also have overt packets always available so that if the result of the Bernoulli process leads sending an overt packet, she has one available to send. This suggests that Alice must first build up some number of overt packets in her buffer prior to starting the above procedure.
In particular, Alice will employ a two-phase system. In the first phase, she will (slightly) slow down the transmission of packets from Jack so as to build up a backlog of packets in her buffer. In the next phase, she generates a renewal process with a rate higher than Jack's transmission rate, and starts sending overt and covert packets according to a Bernoulli splitting procedure as described above. To see how many packets Alice can buffer in the first phase, we consider Lemma 1. Then, building on this Lemma, we present and prove the results for Scenario 1. 
• ∀ρ ∈ (0, 1),
where ξ is independent of ρ (4)
Conversely
The proof is similar to the proof of the covertness of the second phase for Scenario 2 in Theorem 3. See the details of the construction and the proof in [17] . 
where 0 < ρ < 1, then generates inter-arrival times according to p 1 (x, ρ) that represents a renewal process entitled "OvertCovert Process" with a rate λ oc which is higher than Jack's transmission rate. According to this Overt-Covert Process, Alice starts sending both overt and covert packets. But, to decide when she should send a covert or overt packet, she uses a Bernoulli splitting (p-thinning) procedure, i.e., each time she wants to send a packet, first she generates a random variable according to a Bernoulli distribution with
If she observes "Success", she sends a covert packet, otherwise, she sends an overt packet. 
* i is the i th convolution power of q(x) (e.g.
(Number of Packets) The rate at which Alice transmits packets in the Overt-Covert Process is λ oc = (1 − ρ) −1 λ. Denote the total number of overt and covert packets that Alice transmits in the second phase by N oc . Since Alice sends a stream of overt and covet packets in which the locations of covert packets are chosen according to Bernoulli random variables, the total number of covert packets that Alice inserts is
where each b i is a Bernoulli random variable with P(b i = 1) = ρ. By the weak law of large numbers (WLLN) we can show that (see the details of the proof [17] )
Note that for any two events E 1 and E 2 , if P (E 1 ) = 1 and P (E 2 ) = 1, then P(E 1 ∪ E 2 ) ≤ P(E 1 ) + P(E 2 ) = 0 and therefore, P(E 1 ∩ E 2 ) = 1. Now, if we let
Now, if Alice sets
Thus, Alice can insert O ( √ N ) packets in a packet stream of length N .
(Covertness) Assume Willie knows Alice's transmission scheme and parameters as well as the time she starts and ends the first and second phase. He also knows the number of covert packets that Alice has possibly inserted into the channel, N c . In the first phase, she receives a packet stream of length ψN . Therefore, by the results of Lemma 1, Alice
packets while lower bounding Willie's sum of error probabilities P F A + P M D by 1 − ϵ. Therefore, her buffering is covert.
In the second phase, Alice inserts N c covert packets in a packet stream of N oc overt and covert packets. Willie, upon observing inter-arrival times of N oc packets, decides whether Alice has not done anything over the channel and therefore the inter-arrival times of the packets are governed by pdf p 0 (x), (hypothesis H 0 ), or she has inserted N c covert packets along with N oc − N c overt packets and therefore the inter-arrival times of the packets are governed by
, (hypothesis H 1 ). If Willie applies an optimal hypothesis test that minimizes P F A + P M D on the inter-arrival times, then [18] 
where P 0 and P 1 are joint pdfs of the inter-arrival times when H 0 and H 1 are true respectively. Next, we show how Alice can lower bound the sum of average error probabilities by upper bounding
Since inter-arrival times are i.i.d,
Thus,
We can easily see that when the conditions (3)-(5) hold for
We can show that
and thus (see the details in [17] )
Consequently, by (14) , (Failure Analysis) In the second phase, Alice wants to avoid a "failure" event, in which she cannot send an overt packet from her buffer because she has run out of packets. Similar to the failure analysis in [14] , we can show that Alice can choose ψ such that she achieves P f < ζ for any ζ > 0, where P f is the probability of the event "failure" (see the details of the proof in [17] ). See the proof in [17] . In this scenario, Alice is allowed to buffer packets transmitted by Jack and release them when it is necessary; thus she is able to alter the timings of the packets. This suggests that Alice can also alter the timings of the packets to send information to Bob (as in Scenario 2) to achieve a higher throughput for sending covert information. However, this would require Alice and Bob to share a secret key (unknown to adversary Willie) prior to the communication which is not possible in many scenarios. Also, packet insertion works over channels for which sending the information through packet timings does not work, such as complicated channels (e.g. mixed with other flows, then separated) which change the timings of the packets significantly and channels with zero capacity when packet timing approaches are employed (e.g. deterministic queues).
B. General Renewal Model, Packet Timing (Scenario 2)
In this section, we consider Scenario 2: In a Non-Poisson channel, Willie can authenticate packets to determine whether or not they were generated by the legitimate transmitter Jack. Therefore, Alice cannot insert packets into the channel; rather, we assume that Alice is able to buffer packets and release them when she desires; hence, she can encode information in the inter-packet delays by using a secret codebook shared with Bob.
Here, similar to the Poisson case, each of Alice's codewords will consist of a sequence of inter-packet delays to be employed to convey the corresponding message. Also, Alice will employ a two-phase system. In the first phase, she will (slightly) slow down the transmission of packets from Jack to Steve so as to build up a backlog of packets in her buffer. Then, during the codeword transmission phase, she will release packets from her buffer with the inter-packet delays prescribed by the codeword corresponding to the message, while continuing to buffer arriving packets from Jack. To see how much Alice can slow down the packet stream from Jack to Steve without it being detected by warden Willie, we use the results of the Lemma 1. Next, we propose the capacity of G/M/1 in Lemma 2. Then, we calculate the number of packets that Alice should accumulate in her buffer by the start of the second phase so as to, with high probability, have a packet in her buffer at all of the times required by the codeword. Finally, we consider the throughput of Alice's communication in Theorem 5. Consider the G/M/1 queue defined in Section II-A. We propose and prove the upper bound on its capacity in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. The G/M/1 queue with service rate µ and input rate λ < µ satisfies
where e λ (x) = λe −λx .
Proof. (Achievability) Construction:
We assume that at the time of transmission, the queue is in equilibrium. We start the transmission by sending the first packet, and we consider the time that this packet arrives at the queue is time zero. Then, using the shared codebook between the transmitter and the receiver, the transmitter encodes the message into n interpacket delays A n = (A 1 , · · · , A n ); i.e, A i is the time elapsed between i th and (i+1) th packet for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We denote the time that the first packet (called packet zero in [15] ) spends in the queue by D 0 , and let
where D i is the inter-departure time between the i th and (i + 1)
For the G/M/1 queue, we denote the joint pdf of the inter-arrival times by Q A n (a n ), joint pdf of the vector
For a special case in which the inter-arrival times are modeled by exponential random variables with exponential pdf e λ (x), the G/M/1 queue is a M/M/1 queue. For this queue, we denote all of the above joint pdfs by the letter P instead of Q.
Analysis: We can obtain the capacity of the queue [19] :
where [20] 
is the liminf in probability of the sequence of normalized information densities
Comparing (21) with the formula for the capacity in [19] , we see an extra λ in the right hand side (RHS) of (21) that is due to differences between the definitions of capacity in [19] and here. To show that (20) is true, by (21), (22), it is enough to show that there exists a sequence of random variables
To establish (24), it is sufficient to show that there exists a sequence of random variables A 1 , A 2 , · · · such that for every γ > 0
By a few steps of calculations we can prove that [see [17] for details]
Note that in the above equation, the pdfs denoted by letter P are related to M/M/1 queue, but the arguments in the above equation are the random variables related to the G/M/1 queue. Consider the three terms on the right hand side of (26). Similar to proofs of [15, Theorems 6, 7] , we can show that for all γ > 0 (see the details of the proof in [17] )
, we can show that (see the details of the proof in [17] )
Therefore, Eqs. (26) to (29) yield (25) and the proof is complete.
Theorem 5. Consider Scenario 4 with conditions (3-5) true and
where e λ (x) = λe −λx . By embedding information in the inter-packet delays, Alice can covertly and reliably transmit O (N ) bits to Bob in a packet stream of length N . Proof. Construction: To establish covert communication over the timing channel, Alice and Bob share a secret key (codebook) to which Willie does not have access. To build a codebook, a set of M independently generated codewords
according to realizations of a renewal process with inter-arrival pdf p 0 (x) that mimics the overt traffic on the channel between Jack and Steve, where M is the size of the codebook. In particular, to generate a codeword C(J i ), the renewal process of the packets transmitted by Jack is simulated, i.e., C(J i ) consists of inter-arrival times A 1 , · · · , A N (1−ψ) that generated according to the pdf p 0 (x). For each message transmission, Alice uses a new codebook to encode the message into a codeword. According to the codebook, each message corresponds to a codeword that is a series of interpacket delays. Alice starts the transmission of the codeword by sending the first packet and then applies the inter-packet delays to the packets that are being transmitted from Jack to Steve (see Fig. 3 ). On the other hand, Bob knows when to start reading the inter-packet delays and decode them based on the shared codebook.
Per above, Alice's communication includes two phases: a buffering phase and a transmission phase. During the buffering phase [0, τ N ψ ], where 0 < ψ < 1 is a parameter to be defined later, Alice slows down the packet transmission in order to build up packets in her buffer. In particular, Alice's purpose in the first phase is to buffer enough packets to ensure, with high probability, she will not run out of packets during the transmission phase (τ N ψ , τ N ] (see Fig. 4 ).
Analysis:
Since the queue is initially in equilibrium and in both of the phases, Alice's packet transmission rate remains less than the service rate of the queue, the queue stays in equilibrium during the scenario. Thus, we can use the results of Lemma 2.
(Covertness) Suppose that Willie knows when each of the two phases will start and end if Alice chooses to transmit to Bob. Next, we show that during the first phase, Alice's buffering is covert. By Lemma 1, Alice can buffer m = Fig. 4 . Two-phase construction: Alice's communication includes two phases. In the first phase, Alice slows down the transmission and buffers the excess packets. In the next phase, she transmits packets to Bob according to the inter-packet delays in the codeword corresponding to the message to be transmitted.
in the first phase where
while lower bounding the sum of Willie's error probability by 1 − ϵ where 0 < ϵ < 1. Thus, Alice's buffering is covert in this phase. During the second phase, the packet timings corresponding to the selected codeword are an instantiation of a renewal point process with inter-arrival pdf p 0 (x) and hence the traffic pattern is indistinguishable from the pattern that Willie expects on the link from Jack to Steve. Hence, the scheme is covert.
(Reliability) Next, we show that Alice will have a reliable communication to Bob. The notion of reliability is tied to two events. First, Bob should be able to decode the message with arbitrarily low probability of error. This follows by adopting the proposed coding scheme as well as condition (30) (see Lemma 2) . Second, Alice needs to avoid a "failure" event, in which Alice is unable to create the packet timings for the selected codeword because she has run out of packets in her buffer at some point in the codeword transmission process.
In the first phase of Scenario 2, Alice uses the same buffering technique on the same number of packets,N ψ , as in that of Scenario 1. Therefore, in both of the scenarios, she can collect m = O ( √ N ) packets in the first phase (see (13) and (31)). Also, in the second phase of Scenario 4, the rate at which she receives and transmits overt packets is λ, which is the same as in Scenario 3. Combined with the fact that the second phase in both of the scenarios starts when Alice receives the (ψN + 1) th packet and ends when Alice receives the N th packet, the failure analysis of Scenario 4 follows from the one in Scenario 3 (Theorem 3) and we can show that Alice can achieve P f < ζ for any ζ > 0, as long as is defined in (20) and 1 − ψ = ( ( 2 ϵ erf −1 (1 − ζ) ) 2 + 1 ) −1 . Here, in the covertness analysis, calculation of the number of covert bits, and the size of the codebook, we have proved that the transmission is covert given "failure" does not occur. Since P f < ζ for any ζ > 0, the results hold for the general case too.
V. DISCUSSION
Although the regulatory conditions (3)-(5) required for Lemma 1, Theorems 3 and 5 seem restrictive, many probability distributions satisfy these conditions. For example, the generalized gamma distribution and its special cases, exponential distribution, Chi-squared distribution, Rayleigh distribution, Weibull distribution, Gamma distribution, and Erlang distribution, satisfy (3)- (5) . Among the distributions that do not satisfy conditions (3)-(5), are included any distributions whose support is not [0, ∞), such as the Uniform distribution on [a, b] . The intuition is that if Alice slows down the packet stream (which results in scaling up the distribution p 0 (x)) to buffer packets, for a large number of packets, she produces with high probability an inter-packet delay that for certain could not have been generated by p 0 (x). Thus, Willie will detect Alice's buffering with high probability.
VI. CONCLUSION
We present two scenarios for covert communication on a general (i.e. not necessarily Poisson) renewal channel, hence significantly extending our previous work. In the first scenario, since the packets are not authenticated by adversary Willie, Alice communicates with Bob by insertion of the packets into the channel. We propose a two-phase scheme for Alice. In the first phase, she slows down the packet stream to buffer some packets. In the second phase, she inserts her own packets along with Jack's transmitted packets in a slightly higher rate renewal process. If the total number of transmitted packets from Jack to Steve is N , Alice can covertly insert
packets. Next, we analyze the scenario where Willie authenticates the packets; therefore, Alice cannot insert packets. However, we assume that Alice and Bob share a secret key, allowing them to share a secret codebook, and that the only distortion between Alice and Bob is a stable queue. We showed that if Alice buffers some packets first, she can reliably and covertly send O (N ) bits to Bob if the total number of packets transmitted by Jack is N .
